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Rapid advances in genetics promise to being great benefits, through effective prevention and 
treatment of disease and suffering, and through increase of knowledge, skill and prosperity. 
This paper reviews how children are the first main group to be affected by the promised new 
DNA-based genetic knowledge and techniques. Whilst assuming that the embryo and fetus do 
not share the full moral status of the child, this paper questions how attitudes towards prenatal 
existence and new developments in embryology and fetal genetics might alter attitudes 
towards babies and children and also parent-child relationships.  
 Almost all reports of plans for genetic interventions on children imply that their interests are 
totally aligned with those of their benevolent parents. Closer analysis of child-adult 
relationships reveals inter-generational conflicts. (1) Parents can control  children’s lives, 
their enjoyments, knowledge, resources and life chances. The new genetics will enable adults 
to control children's identities in previously unimaginable ways, along with change in social 
attitudes and structures that prepare for genetic services to be widely available, as this paper 
reviews.   
 
Presenting the new genetics  
The Human Genome Project (HGP) that reveals the structure of DNA has been presented to 
the public in quasi-religious terms, as if it provides essential answers to the great questions 
about humanity, for example: `It is a complete manual for building and running the human 
body. We'll be the only species who knows how to build ourselves, to know who we are and 
where we came from'. (2) 
  One approach, through which geneticists gain considerable financial and political support, is 
by the use of the alarming comparison, when they compare their intentions with a more 
alarming alternative that makes current plans seem safe in comparison. For example, a decade 
ago research on human somatic (body) cells was justified as much less dangerous than taboo 
research on germline (reproductive) cells. The latter cells irrevocably affect all future 
generations, and scientists undertook never to tamper with them.(3)  A few years later, human 
cloning and other germ-line interventions were being developed, and laws to regulate them 
being passed. Again, some scientists present their preferred development as safer than a 
rejected alternative, thus appearing to combine scientific innovation with judicious prudence 
and public benefit. They use the reassuringly positive phrase `therapeutic cloning’ to describe 
cloning for research purposes, although the meaning of `therapeutic’  word is stretched to 
denote not immediate therapy but experiment which might possibly one day produce effective 
therapies. This is contrasted with the dangers of `reproductive’ human cloning, that would 
allow the cloned embryo to develop into a child.  
  The argument illustrates the moral shift over a decade that now assumes the public will more 
readily accept the use and destruction of certain embryos for research, than their subsequent 
birth as children. Such complex changes in the public psyche may be impossible to explain, 
but part of this process appears to involve: changes in language from `pre-term baby’, to 
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`fetus’, to `embryo’, that distance human origins from humanity and blur moral debates; and 
old popular myths that link childhood to deficiency and deformity, (4) mingled with fears of 
monstrous birth. Scientists appeal to public fears by claiming that their embryo research will 
reduce and prevent such births. They describe `tragic’ families who `desperately need' these 
new technologies to prevent their children from inheriting genetic conditions. Less explicit, 
but perhaps more influential subliminally, are images of very abnormal children, in magazines 
and television programmes on genetics. The narrators’ tones mingle pity with hints of disgust; 
the whole child is lost in the emphasis on certain deficiencies.   
  The journalism conveys inter-related messages: this `suffering’ can be prevented; it is kinder 
and better to prevent such intolerable lives and therefore to prevent such beings from existing; 
the embryo stage is not only morally neutral in terms of enabling embryos to exist or to die, it 
is becoming morally desirable to intervene; these interventions may be for the benefit of the 
particular embryo and parents through treatment, or for society through  research; it is 
progressive to regard some embryos as research material, provided the adults concerned 
consent or do not refuse. Current legislation internationally (5) illustrates the gradually 
shifting legal and moral boundaries, away from prohibition and towards controlled human 
germline research. Some governments require that only `spare’ embryos from infertility 
treatments may be used, and no embryos may be produced solely for research purposes, 
another  use of  the alarming comparison argument mentioned earlier. To understand debates 
about the new genetics involves examining how argument, language and euphemism are 
presented. The questions missing from public debates include asking how public images and 
general fears about deficient, imperfect babies and children are being fostered, and what latent 
irrevocable new futures we might bequeath to future generations. 
 
Developing the new genetics   
Britain now allows `therapeutic’ cloning of human embryos .(6) Germline research has been 
conduced for years on animals and human embryos in countries without legal restrictions, 
including the US, which regulates only publicly funded research. Some doctors are cautious 
about how these advances might affect children, (7) but others dismiss criticisms as irrational, 
sometimes in a paradoxically emotive way: `To be hysterical about the use of embryos for 
tissue engineering does not make any sense if you are going to save a life`.(8)  
  In 1990, there were promises of `gene therapy cures’ within a few years, but a decade of 
trials has produced almost no effective treatments. Recent reports assert that the Human 
Genome project may have grossly underestimated the total number of human genes, and call 
for the meaning of the still invisible `gene’ to be defined.(9) However, with the 30-40,000 
plus human genes, that are all copied into the millions of cells in each body, attempts to alter 
our gene structure are immensely complicated. Gene therapy is likely to be most successful 
when it alters genes in the pre-embryo’s 32 or so cells, though at this stage it is easier and 
cheaper to select out `faulty’ embryos or select in preferred ones, than to attempt to correct 
them. British couples can now select in vitro embryros to delete those with a full condition or 
carrier status and also ones likely to provide compatible samples to treat  a diseased 
relative.(10) There are concerns that these children will be seen as means, rather than ends in 
themselves, with the risk that they will be rejected if the treatments to which they contribute 
are unsuccessful. 
  At present, genetic knowledge is used to reduce disease and disability in two main ways: 
offering life-style advice to (mainly middle aged and older) people at higher identified genetic 
risk, or offering termination of affected pregnancies – an intergenerational approach. New 
DNA-based genetics as yet hardly affects the health services, but structures, routines, skills 
and attitudes are in place (11) that will allow genetic knowledge and techniques to flood into 
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the health services as soon as they are available, without public or professional debate and 
deliberate decision making.(12) One example is the aim to isolate fetal cells from maternal 
blood that it already routinely collected in prenatal clinics; 4-500 genetic conditions could 
then be screened for relatively quickly and cheaply, once the technique is developed.  
 
Attitudes towards the new genetics 
British public opinion about GM (genetically modified) plants and animals has generally 
swung from lack of interest towards hostility and fear. Human genetics, however, tends to be 
seen as the silver lining to the genetic cloud. The mass media promote enthusiastic beliefs that 
human genetics will, indeed already does, relieve suffering in new miraculous ways that 
justify all manner of animal experiments.  
  Genetics enticingly promises doctors Science Based Medicine - precise knowledge of the 
etiology, diagnosis and prognosis of disease - in contrast to the lesser consequentialist science 
of Evidence Based Medicine. Convinced of such promised benefits, in 2001 the British 
government set up a Commission to ensure that human genetic services will be fully used and 
equally available to all. Whilst being equitable, such a programme can become a drag net, 
(13) when services which very much benefit a few people at high risk are gradually offered 
routinely to everyone, with increasing pressures on practitioners to offer them and 
patients/clients to accept them.  Examples include prenatal screening, and screening of IVF 
embryos before implantation. 
  Science, industry, commerce, the law, especially patent law, and governments aim to exploit 
immensely profitable genetic research and development. The vast sums invested raise 
questions about whether public benefit or profit is the prime motive and guiding value. When 
economic market values determine policy, children can be very vulnerable: they cannot vote 
or own property and others are appointed to make decisions for them. For example, all 
children born in Iceland are enrolled into the DeCode genetic databank unless their parents 
object; children cannot withdraw until they are adult. Even then, they cannot backdate their 
withdrawal, (14) and their childhood data will always be used. It has been argued that children 
have no right to genetic privacy, their genes belong to the family gene pool and should be 
common knowledge for all the relatives.(15) Ethical discussions about genetics are mainly 
confined to adult-centred issues of consent, confidentiality and insurance, in which children’s 
concerns tend to be over-looked.  
  Another crucial kind of vulnerable childhood dependence is that children’s work at school, 
at home, and in their communities, is seldom recognised as `work’, or valued or paid for, and 
instead they are expected to `earn’ their place by the `emotional labour’ of being pleasing and 
compliant.(16) The United States has the only government in the world to refuse to ratify the 
UN 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which respects the `worth and dignity’ of 
every child. US writers on ethics especially magnify and endorse parents’ rights, in effect, to 
treat their children as property rather than persons: `to shape and guide their child’s future 
lifestyle and life plans’ because `rearing a child in an environment in which their [parents’] 
values and beliefs flourish is a principle reason for becoming parents’.(17)  While there may 
be some benign truth in this remark, it could be read as an illiberal attempt at moral cloning. 
The comment dangerously denies children’s early propensity to develop their own beliefs 
through their own unique experiences. It suggests an arrogant intolerance, not only towards 
children’s thinking and values, but also to the moral struggle for children and adults to live 
with peace and justice in very mixed societies, and in global `environments’ not dominated by 
the parents’ personal values. This entails some respect for other values and beliefs which the 
parents’ supposed rights seem to exclude. The comment also implicitly denies that, though 
not always easy, parenting and its rewards involve relating to children as persons, not simply 
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as things to be `shaped’. The most ominous aspect of promoting an ethic of parental power is 
that it could validate parents’ future far greater potential powers over the genetic make up of 
their children, for good or ill.      
  Contemporary geneticists distance themselves from eugenics, which they define as a past 
history of state enforced abortion, sterilisation and euthanasia programmes on resisting people 
But this obvious, `front door’ eugenics is contrasted with `back-door' or `consumer 
eugenics’,(18) when states achieve similar results though `therapeutic’ abortions and 
promotion of parental prenatal choices.  
  Genetic interventions that affect the next generation include pre-partnership/marriage, 
preconceptual, pre-implantation, and prenatal tests and counselling. Abortion is frequently 
justified as less distressing than a child’s impaired life. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PIGD), that selects which embryos to implant in the uterus, is promoted as less distressing, 
and less of an ethical issue, than abortion. As already mentioned, doctors can modify embryos 
and add or delete cells. It is currently debated, for example, whether to select out only 
embryos and fetuses with a full genetic condition, or also to withdraw those with the carrier 
trait (that will not affect the child but might affect the child’s children). Should embryos with 
a late onset condition not be implanted? And how many healthy years before the condition 
develops constitute a worthwhile life 60, 40 or only 20 years? These calculations tend to 
discount childhood as a worthwhile time in its own right.  
  Couples can now choose to implant an embryo that will be a compatible `donor' of tissue to 
treat a diseased relative. The new techniques relieve and prevent much distress, but can also 
pose painful, bewildering, sometimes regretted choices,(19) and concerns that children will be 
valued as the means towards other ends, rather than for themselves. The techniques contribute 
to geneticisation,(20) when causes, processes, prevention and treatment of disease and 
disability are all reduced to genetic terms. There is then the danger of ignoring other vital and 
remediable factors such as social inequalities, which can so greatly increase or reduce 
disabling constraints on all people’s lives, whether they have genetic impairments or not. 
Further, in emphasising solely biological problems and solutions, geneticisation denies 
strengths in parents and children, such as human agency and ingenuity in overcoming 
problems. It thus implicitly and insidiously dehumanises and disempowers them.  
  Genetic services contribute to the privatising of parental responsibility.(21) Whether women 
decide to end or continue with their pregnancy, they carry new explicit responsibility and 
potential guilt for their conscious `choice’ about whether or not to have an impaired child. 
Formerly, when the event used to be regarded more as a blameless matter of chance, there was 
stronger case for shared societal responsibility for, and inclusion of, these children. Now, 
however, negative accounts of disability tend to influence prenatal counselling(19) and 
midwives raise parental expectations (demands?) when they assert that `everyone wants a 
perfect baby’.(12) This does not encourage tolerant, inclusive attitudes towards the next 
generation. Although hard to measure, it is also hard to believe that the effects of mass 
prenatal services, checking almost every pregnancy for fetal pathology and for potential 
termination, do not affect individual parent-child relationships and social inter-generation 
attitudes. Certainly, rising maternal tentativeness has been demonstrated during the 
impressionable months of pregnancy,(22) and linked to fetal tests. Might this more 
provisional, tentative parenting continue after birth? Reported intolerance, exclusion and 
abandonment of children from schools and homes are markedly increasing. By Spring 2002 in 
Britain, local taxes were considerably increased to pay, it was argued, for the rapidly rising 
numbers of children removed from their parents’ inadequate care, and also for treating these 
children’s complex problems. Among other powerful influences on children’s lives and health 
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and on inter-generation relations, the impact of current and likely future trends in the prenatal 
and genetic services urgently needs to be reviewed.   
   The new genetics promises, further, not only to reduce disease but also to enhance future 
children.(23) Enhancements for height, athleticism, intelligence and other features are not yet 
possible genetically. Yet the current selecting out of fetuses likely to have low intelligence 
(Down's syndrome, fragile X) or low stature (achondroplasia) with trends, such as the 
widespread use of prescribed drugs to modify children’s mood and behaviour, pave the way 
for social acceptance of genetic modifications when they are possible. Should parents be 
allowed to enhance their children genetically, and how could that affect generational politics? 
Will enhancements inevitably become acceptable, partly through global market competition, 
when clients and scientists travel to countries that permit such endeavours, and pressure their 
own governments to allow them? Arthur Caplan, official ethics adviser to the US HGP, 
predicts that doctors will routinely make total DNA scans, advise on healthy life-styles, select 
and enhance embryos. Routine brain scans will enable doctors to control behaviours and 
learning difficulties, and enable employers to select new staff. `The rush to use eugenics will 
be amazing with parents competing to give their kids the best start in life`, death may be 
deferred indefinitely. `Many parents will leap at the chance to make their children smarter, 
fitter and prettier.’ Technology which `simply makes for better children’ will overtake ethical 
concerns. `In a competitive market society, people are going to want to give their kids an 
edge....a genetic edge is not greatly different from an environmental edge....You might 
download French into the 3-year-old's brain directly.`(24)  
  Will parents come to feel careless, negligent, callous, if they refuse genetic enhancements for 
future children? When enhanced children fail to live up to costly expectations how will they 
fare? When unenhanced children are ill or disabled, whose fault will it be, and who will pay 
for their care  
  Although a decade of human single gene research has brought few results, experiments to 
insert a whole chromosome that can carry thousands of genes have succeeded, for example, in 
mice. The mice offspring inherited the extra chromosome, and the technique opens the 
possibility for numerous irrevocable preconceptual choices to create designer babies. Human 
babies, occupying an ambiguous position between humans and animals,(26) are likely to be 
among the first candidates(3) for such advances. New genetic treatments may simply be 
accepted as better routine versions of current best practice, instead of being critically debated, 
not least for their impact on childhood. Behaviouralist interventions often imply that the child 
is the problem, and aim to fit the child to adult-centric requirements. For example, `attention 
deficit disorder’ describes children who do attend, but to things, and in ways, which adults  do 
not want them to. The power to alter children through genetics instead of drugs will be 
immensely greater.  
  This raises profound ethical questions, about the meaning of human existence, identity and 
intergenerational obligations. Far from examining these questions, current ethics attention 
turns to the putative benefits for wealthy adults rather than to potential problems for children 
and society. Scientists’ claims, mentioned above, that genetics provides quasi-religious 
knowledge extend to assumptions that the morality and virtue endorsed by the `selfish gene’ 
(selfish parent) replaces morality with ancient roots in religion. `[N]o one has the guts to say it 
[but]: If we could make better human beings by knowing how to add genes, why shouldn’t 
we? What’s wrong with it?...Evolution can be just damn cruel, and to say that we’ve got the 
perfect genome, and there’s some sanctity? I’d like to know where that idea came from, 
because it’s utter silliness.’(25)  `The right to a custom made child is merely the natural 
extension of our current discourse of reproductive rights. I see no virtue in the role of chance 
in conception, and great virtue in expanding choice.’(26) `[O]ver the next two centuries, the 
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number and variety of possible genetic extensions to the basic human genome will rise 
exponentially...Extensions that were once unimaginable will become indispensable...to those 
parents [the `generich’ 10% of people] who are able to afford them.’(27) The extensions will 
include cross-species genetics, that picks desired characteristics from animals to create `post-
humans’. The question we have to ask first is: Can children and global society afford these 
genetic changes, which treat children as consumer artifacts to alter according to other people’s 
whims? `Where love, compassion, altruism and justice have failed, genetic manipulation will 
not succeed’(28) - and is likely to erode these essential intergenerational virtues that sustain 
human life. To assess the promise or threat to children of the new genetics involves moving 
beyond medical and genetic questions to include social and political questions as well.     
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